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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to §35-1-86 Utah Code
Ann., et seq., (1953) as amended.
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order entered by the Honorable Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) for the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, pursuant to a
hearing held before ALJ Allen on March 16,1989, and the subsequent order
of the industrial commission, conducted on June 22,1989, denying review of
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the ALJ. In his
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, the administrative law
judge concluded that although the appellant had suffered an injury as the result
of a slip and fall on October 28, 1989, that he found no evidence that the
appellant, based upon his own testimony, had suffered a head injury as the
result of the fall.

The appellant moved that the conclusions of the

administrative law judge be reviewed by the industrial commission, which
upheld the findings of the administrative law judge, although commenting
that:
Finally, the commission finds that the medical
evidence in this case is conflicting with respect to
whether the alleged head injury could possibly
cause the applicant's current psychiatric and/or
neurological problems. Based upon these
considerations, the commission finds that the
administrative law judge was correct in determining
that no head injury occurred on October 26,1986.
Order of the Commission denying motion for review, pp. 1-2.
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STATEMENT O F ISSUES

1.

Did the ALJ abuse his discretion in failing to impanel a

Medical Advisory Board, or in failing to provide a Medical
Consultant for the Court, in accordance with §35-1-77, Utah
Code Ann.?
2.

Did the ALJ err in relying upon the testimony of a witness

whose competence and credibility were at issue?
3.

Did the ALJ err is failing to provide an award for

Temporary Partial Disability in keeping with the requirements of
§35-1-65.1, Utah Code Ann.?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES
AND RULES

The conduct of and outcome of these proceedings are governed by §351, Utah Code Ann., and the Rules of this Court, appropriate selections of
which have been reproduced by photocopy for the Court's convenience, as
contained in Appendix "A". In particular, the appellant refers this Court to
§35-1-77, Utah Code Ann.. (1953) et seq., as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE C A S E

This is an appeal reviewing the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order of Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge for the Industrial
Commission of the State of Utah dated 27 March, 1989, denying the claim of
the appellant for an award of compensation under the provisions of §35-1,
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Utah Code Ann., and of the Order of the commission denying review of the
same.
For the purposes of this appeal, the appellant wishes to make clear the
fact that he alleges no new set of facts being argued for the first time on
appeal, and that the issues being argued by the appellant are legal in nature,
centering upon an alleged abuse of discretion. Therefore, the appellant
assumes, arguendo, that the facts operative in this appeal should be taken
from three sources, the findings of fact of the ALJ and their review by the
industrial commission, the transcript of the hearing, and the medical records
involved, all of which taken together constitute the record in this case. The
medical records should be considered as underlying the ALJ's decision in this
matter, and are fundamental to the findings drawn which are based in no small
part upon the testimony of the appellant. On numerous occasions, the ALJ
disallowed the testimony of the appellant, stating in effect that the medical
records spoke for themselves, or where already in the "file" and needed no
substantiation or further explanation. (T. 24, 28, 39,46,66)
In the findings of fact, the administrative law judge concluded that there
had indeed been a slip and fall on October 26,1986, involving Mr. Wilstead,
while he was acting within the scope of his employment with co-respondent
West Way Motor Cargo. The administrative law judge further concluded that
there was no injury to appellant's head during the course of the slip and fall.
The administrative law judge found that the appellant had sustained a
temporary aggravation of a preexisting injury to the lower back, but that he
suffered no injury to the brain as a result of a head injury in that slip and fall.
Importantly, the administrative Law Judge did not make any finding
relative to the effect that a slip and fall serious enough to re-fracture a
vertebrae might have on the human brain. The administrative law judge
3

simply found that there was no contact between the head of the appellant itself
and the pavement, or fuel island curb.
Finally, the appellant invites this court to review the voluminous
medical file on record, and note that every single one of the
neuropsychologists, and psychiatrists concluded that the appellant was
severely depressed, constituting an undisputed fact, and that only one medical
provider competent to render conclusions relative to the existence of Organic
Brain Syndrome concluded that the appellant was not suffering from Organic
Brain Syndrome. The greater weight of the evidence favors the existence of
Organic Brain Syndrome, and there is no dispute that the appellant was and is
severely depressed.

SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT

The appellant questions the actions of the administrative law judge in
entering an arbitrary and capricious finding that appellant suffered no damage
to his brain as a result of his slip and fall, without the advice and counsel of a
medical review board. The standard of review involving issues of law for
administrative proceedings is quite different than the standard regarding
findings of fact. The court applies on review the "correction-of-error"
standard, giving "no difference to the expertise [or lack of it] of the
commission". (Board of Education v. Olsen. 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984))
Regarding the role of this court upon review, the standard to be applied is
quite liberal in contrast to that applied to findings of fact below.
The administrative law judge proceeded in ruling upon the issue of
organic brain damage without the benefit of the expertise of qualified
physicians. As Dr. Kotrady states in his report (pages 212 - 213 of the
medical records):
4

It is my opinion that this man is severely depressed.
The depression appears to stemfromthe industrial
accident in October, 1986.
***

I believe that he [the appellant] is suffering from
organic brain syndrome secondary to the accident
[at the truck stop]. It is my opinion that he is
completely disabled as a result of this condition.
The administrative law judge proceeded in formulating conclusions of law
given this sort of declaration by the appellant's physicians without the benefit
of a medical review panel. Furthermore, the level of disability from organic
brain syndrome is difficult to determine, and the administrative law judge
further erred in proceeding in light of the complexity and highly technical
nature of the issues at hand:
It is more difficult in cases of depression due to
brain injury to determine the degree of disability
than would be the case in the injury of a limb or
some other body part... I would judge him to be
totally disabled in his ability to perform his current
line of work — driving a truck. I also feel that it
would be highly unlikely, that in the near term he
would be able to obtain and maintain other forms of
employment
Dr. Bushnell, at page 161 of the medical reports.
In short, common sense alone or practical experience regarding general
medical matters of daily life is wholly insufficient to supply one with the
means of addressing the existence of such an injury. Furthermore, the
administrative law judge was without competent medical advice as to the effect
that organic brain disorder could have on the appellant's ability to testify or
5

present himself as a credible witness, or even of more fundamental issues,
such as the competence of the appellant to testify.
Organic Brian Syndrome, or Organic Mental Syndrome, presents itself
in a variety of forms, each with its own symptomatology. Dementia,
Alzheimer's Disease, Organic Personality Syndrome, Amnestic Syndrome,
Organic Hallucinosis, Organic Affective Disorder and Organic Delusional
Syndrome all fall under the general heading or Organic Brain Syndrome. (See
appendix "B", attached) Each of these aspects of Organic Brain Syndrome
presents itself with different symptoms, which will be discussed in greater
detail in appellant's argument proper. Organic Brain Syndrome therefore
presents a complex scenario of psychological symptoms, which are difficult to
establish and prove, given the fact that in our world of scientific approaches to
virtually all human inquiry, we depend almost exclusively upon physical
evidence, when in fact some things, such as Organic Brain Syndrome have no
physical manifestation that can be perceived clearly given our current
standards of investigation. Nevertheless, although it is almost impossible to
find physical evidence of Alzheimer's Disease in some patients, spending a
few minutes with them readily convinces one that the do in fact have the
disease, in spite of the lack of physical evidence. There, the A U needed
experts to assist the Administrative court in assessing, first of all, the
fundamental competence of the appellant as the only witness of the slip and
fall, and need experts to advise it as to the ability of the appellant to offer
credible, non-contradictory testimony over a given period of time. To
conclude that someone diagnosed with Organic Brain Syndrome and severe
depression is not a credible witness appears facile and misses fundamental
issues relative to the truthfulness or reliability of the facts underlying the
AU's decision denying an award to the appellant.
6

Utah Code Annotated §35-1-77, provides for the impaneling of a
medical advisory board to assist the administrative judge in theresolutionof
matters which involve a medical expertise beyond that possessed by the judge.
It is important to remember that hearings in these matters are fact finding
forums primarily, and that the administrative law judge is to, in essence,
conduct an inquiry into the facts surrounding the assertions of the claimant.
The AU is armed with a battery of statutorily created mechanisms designed to
supply discretionary fact-finding ability not found in courts of law. For that
reason, greater weight is given to the findings made by the administrative law
judge, and on appeal, one must demonstrate that the facts are wholly
unsupported by the evidence presented at the hearing. (Kaiser Steel
Corporation v. Monfredi. 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981)). However, when in
the light of difficult issues (such as a claimant who has sustained previous
industrial injuries and who now presents himself as a brain injured witness)
the ALJ shirks the duty to make a sufficient inquiry and to take advantage of
the expertise readily available through fact-finding mechanisms so as to draw
reasonable factual findings and legal conclusions, this Court has the
opportunity to rectify and remedy such an obvious abuse of statutory
discretion in order to meet the ends of justice.
Central and key to the finding of a compensable accident, or the lack
thereof, is the establishment of both a legal cause of the injury as well as a
medical cause. Certainly the appellant concedes that in cases where the
claimant lost a finger or limb while operating industrial equipment at the
claimant's place of employment while in the scope of employment, provides
both legal and medical cause for establishing a compensable injury. The
resolution of such claims is, compared to the issues in the present one, quite
simple. However, the appellant made a claim, the complexity of which goes
7

far beyond the bounds of experience and knowledge of all but experts, in
asserting an organic brain damage resultant from the slip and fall. The
appellant assert therefore, that the administrative judge committed reversible
error in failing to find both a legal and medical cause (or the lack thereof)
regarding the appellant's claims, in violation of the standards established by
the Supreme Court of Utah:
[T]he key ingredient of an industrial accident is an
unexpected occurrence. That occurrence may be
"either the cause or the result of an injury.
***

The next step in determining whether an injury is a
compensable accident requires analysis of whether
the injury arose out of or in the course of
employment. . . This factor requires proof of a
causal connection between the injury and the
working conditions ... [W]e first consider the legal
cause of the injury and then its medical cause.
***

Under the statute as now written, "the commission
may refer the medical aspects of the case to a
medical panel appointed by the commission. . .
Although referral to the medical panel is not
required by statute, we believe in this case that the
findings of that panel would aid the administrative
law judge. . . (evidence of causal connection
between work related event and the injury may be
uncertain or highly technical whereby failure to refer
the case may be an abuse of discretion).
Hone v. J.F. Shea Company. 728 p.2d 1008 (Utah 1986), citations omitted,
emphasis in original.
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In finding no head injury resultant form the October 1986 slip and fall,
the ALT dodged the issue of medical causation. The appellant did, according
to the Findings of Fact, sustain a fall, the force of which was sufficient to refracture the L-l vertebra. There was no medical evidence taken regarding
whether or not such a fall could compress the spine in such a manner so as to
damage the brain stem, or jar the head sufficiently so as to cause brain injury.
In short, although the "records" of the physicians "speak for themselves",
they are silent as to whether or not there is, for the purposes of Worker's
Compensation, a medical cause for the appellant's claim of brain damage.
The records simply do not address the issues of medical causation, which was
improperly decided by the ALT, in accordance with his own common capacity
and knowledge of neuropsychology. Furthermore, there records were silent
as to the interplay of the injury, which was no doubt quite painful, the
previous mental or emotional state of the appellant, the severe depression
present following the accident, and the substantial issue of brain damage. The
medical record is silent concerning the credibility of the appellant's
"flashback", which in light of common sense may seem absurd or
incredulous, but in light of brain damage or organic brain syndrome coupled
with depression, is in fact quite reasonable. Therefore, although the medical
records did speak for themselves on certain issues, there were dead silent on
others which were of key importance in resolving the appellant's claim below.
The reliance of the AU on such information and his failure to impanel a
medical review board and engage experts to assist in the fact finding mission
of the ALJ and the Industrial Commission is grave error, warranting a rehearing under the written guidance of this Court, sufficient to preserve
traditional notions of justice and equity, for which the Worker's
Compensation laws were designed and implemented.
9

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE FACT-FINDINfi BODIES
WHOSE PRIMARY MISSION IS TO UNCOVER THF TRUTH OF A CIATM
THROUGH A WTOF ARRAY OF STATUTORY

MECHANISMS

The mission of the Industrial Commission ("commission"), regarding
claims made by worker's for injury awards, is primarily that of facts finding,
in this regard, they differ significantly from judicial courts.

The

administrative courts of the commission are more correctly compared with
those of continental Europe, than those of the Anglo-American system.
Essentially, they are inquisitorial in nature, with a judge resembling at times a
prosecutor, rather than an impartial arbitrator and judge of law alone. Unlike
the judicial courts of this State, Administrative Law Judges (ALJ's) of the
commission can actively participate, without motion of counsel, to move a
case along a particular line of fact-finding. In this sense, they "prosecute" the
case on at least a co-equal basis with counsel. In order to provide for such
"prosecution", the laws of this State have vested ALJ's with broad
discretionary powers not granted to judges in courts of justice. The equitable
purposes of the granting of such discretion are important. The State thus
allows for the speedy conclusion of Worker's Compensation claims. At
times, however, if such discretion is abused, the legal conclusions drawn
from such inquiries is not afforded a significant degree of deference on
appeal, whereas thefindingsof underlying fact are.
Examples of the broad discretion discussed are found in Appendix "A".
In §35-1-77, Utah Code Ann., there is a provision for the impaneling of a
medical review board, or the hiring of medical consultants to assist the ALJ in
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drawing appropriate conclusions for the raw or naked fact gathered into the
record. At one time, the impaneling of the board was mandatory, but issues
of cost savings prompted the legislature to amend the statute, making it
discretionary. §35-1-85.1, Utah Code Ann. Allows the ALJ, on a co-equal
basis with counsel to notice and take depositions of any person, in order to
facilitate fact-finding. $35-1-91. Utah Code Ann, provides that the ALT can
order an autopsy at its own discretion, without motion from counsel, and
without hearing counsel's arguments on the matter. §35-1-94, Utah Code
Ann., allows the ALT to order the inspection, or to personally inspect, the
records of employers involved in the claim dispute. §35-1-98, Utah Code
Ann, gives the AU discretion to order reports from medical providers,
irrespective of those submitted by counsel, or in addition to them. In short,
the ALJ has all the powers necessary to conduct discovery as if she or he were
counsel. In fact, the ALJ is in reality "super" counsel, since such discovery
can be made "ex parte", and without argument, objections or hearings.
In emphasizing the fact-finding role of the commission, the Supreme
Court of Utah has stated that the courts of the commission are administrative
and ministerial in nature, and are only "clothed" with judicial powers (Palle v.
Ind. Comm'n.. 81 Utah 372, 18 P.2d 299 (1933)), and that the commission
is an administrative body, an "arm of the state", not the product of the judicial
branch of government. (Woldberg v. Ind. Comm'n.. 74 Utah 309, 279 P.2d
609 (1929)) The fact that such discretionary fact-finding mechanisms is
provided by statute is evidence alone that they should be employed whenever
situations call for expertise or special knowledge. The failure to do so is the
sum and substance of "abuse of discretion".
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POINT II
THE PURPOSES OF THE W O R K E R ' S COMPENSATION LAWS HAVE BEEN
FRUSTRATED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE A L T

The purpose of fact-finding by the ALT is to place responsibility for
industrially related accidents upon industry and no upon the State or the
individual citizens of the Utah. The Worker's Compensation laws are the
product of the industrial revolution, which, as an ever-increasing urbanization
unfolded, involved a larger and larger working class, with an increased risk of
injury due to more complex methods of production. A policy decision was in
effect made when the legislature decided to lay the costs of industry on the
shoulders of industry through such laws for appropriate compensation. As
stated by the Supreme Court of Utah:
The purposes which underlie the Workmen's
Compensation Act are: to assure o the insured
employee and his dependants an income during the
period of his total disability and to provide
compensation for any resulting permanent disability;
to accomplish this by a simple and speedy
procedure which eliminates the expense delay, and
uncertainty in having to prove negligence on the part
of the employer; and to thus require industry to bear
the burden of the injuries suffered in it.

Wilstead v. Ind. Comm'n.. 407 P.2d 692 (Utah 1965)
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that:
We have also repeatedly held that this statute {for
Worker's Compensation] would be liberally
construed, and if there is any doubt respecting the
12

right to compensation, it should be resolved in favor
of a recovery."
Chandler v. Ind. Comm'n.. 55 Utah 213, 184 P.2d 1020 (1919) at 1021.
The legislature of this State made the conscious decision to create a
commission designed to place the burden of industrial accidents upon the
shoulders of industry. In order to accomplish this, the commission has been
vested, as an arm of the state itself, with broad discretion in its fact-finding
mission.
It appears that the ALT in the present case is unapprised of the mission
and goals of the Worker's Compensation laws of this State. I found that there
indeed had been an industrially related accident, involving the re-injury of the
claimant's lower back, yet failed to provide compensation, and instead it has
forced the claimant, and the citizens of this State, to bear the expense of this
accident. Furthermore, the ALT failed in inquire into the causal links between
the obviously powerful fall to the ground, and the alleged brain injury,
independent of any injury to the head. In so doing, the costs of the claimant's
inability to function as an employable member of the society of this State is
born by the claimant and the citizens of Utah. Such is in direct conflict with
the purpose of the Worker's Compensation laws.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR A TEMPORARY

PARTIAL DISABILITY SUFFEREP AS THE RESULT OF THE SLIP ANP FALL IN
OCTOBER OF

1986

In his Conclusions of Law, the AU states that he determined that Mr.
Wilstead sustained a "temporary aggravation to his low back on October 26th,
1986, while employed by Westway Motor Freight, with no permanent
13

impairment resulting therefrom." (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, p. 8) §35-1-65.1, Utah Code Ann, provides for an award based upon
temporary partial disability resulting from an industrially related accident. The
ALT found that such temporary partial disability had in fact occurred, yet
failed to make an award based upon that finding. Such is obvious error, and
should result in reversal in order to determine the appropriate amount of the
award Mr. Wilstead should receive, or in the alternative, it is appropriate for
this Court to make such an award upon review.
POINT IV
THE ALT ABUSED THE STATUTORY DISCRETION VESTED IN THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TN FATLINC. TO IMPANEL A M E D I C A L A D V I S O R Y
BOARD OR HIRE A MFPTCAL CONSULTANT TO ASSIST TN RESOLVING TSSTIF.S
RELATING TO THE COMPETENCY OF M R . WILSTEAD. THE CREDIBILITY OF
HTS TESTIMONY AND THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION OF HIS

DEPRESSION AND BRAIN DAMAGE,

The fact that medical providers agreed unanimously that Mr. Wilstead
was severely depressed, and that others claimed he was brain damaged, raised
serious issues regarding the competency of Mr. Wilstead, his ability to offer
credible testimony and the medical causation of the brain damage and
depression. This abuse of discretion was not brought to the attention of the
ALT or the commission, but is raised on Mr. Wilstead's petition for review by
this Court.
However, in order to understand the implications of raising a matter for
the first time on appeal, we should divide factual issues from questions of
law, or from the advancement of a particular legal theory at the hearing.
Unfortunately, there is little Utah law on the subject of Worker's
Compensation compared to that generated by many other states. Therefore,
14

the appellant cites the following California cases for the benefit of this Court
regarding the split between new facts and new theories of law or questions of
law on appeal: Muffett v. Rovster. 195 Cal.Rptr. 73 (1983); Wilson v.
Lewis. 165 Cal.Rptr. 396 (1980).
The Supreme Court of Utah did address this very issue in the case of
Stanley v. Ind. Comm'n.. 8 P.2d 770 (Utah 1932). The court therein stated
at page 771:
The rule that pertains to the courts to the effect that
parties cannot try a case on one theory and then
attempt to gain reversal upon some other theory on
appeal not advanced on the trial should probably not
be applied as strictly to the commission ... The
reasons that lie at the base of that rule as applied to
the courts are not as potent as applied to the
commission. It is its duty to determine whether the
conditions precedent exist which entitle an applicant
to payment. Consequently it has the duty to
determine, regardless of the theories advanced by
counsel, whether the condition precedent exists.
The Supreme Court demonstrated its understanding of the purpose of the
commission and that its primary function is to determine the appropriateness
of an award to the claimant. The hearing before the ALT was not a true
adversarial hearing, and the discretionary powers of the commission,
discussed previously, combine to make the strict rule forbidding the
advancement of one theory at trial and another on appeal untenable, and
subject the applicability of that rule to a case by case testing. It is the raising
of new facts for the first time on appeal, which call for the entry of factual
findings by the appellate court, which is clearly improper. The appellant has
taken steps to assure this Court that it calls for no new or additional factual
determination in these proceedings. Instead, Mr. Wilstead contends that the
15

commission had all of the information necessary to raise the issues of
competency, capacity to testify and medical causation of the claimed brain
damage before it. The ALJ had the duty to ascertain medical causation, had
the duty to employ statutory discovery tools and mechanisms for resolving
these issues, and failed to do so. These issues were clearly before the ALT. It
is inconceivable that one could elicit testimony form an individual whom
medical providers had concluded was brain damaged, without some question
as to competency and capacity surfacing. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that
the ALJ was unaware of the issue of medical causation in this case, however,
rather than seeking competent and qualified advice and guidance on these
subjects, the ALJ proceeded as a lay person.
Under ordinary circumstances, this may not be an abuse of discretion.
The nature of ulcers, for example, is a subject that can be understood by most
persons with a simple explanation with visual aids. We are not dealing with
so simple a subject in this appeal. While the appellant does not call for any
factual finding by this Court, Mr. Wilstead points out through counsel the
highly technical nature of his claim for brain damage.
As stated by Dr. Richard L. Elliot in his article "An Introduction to
Organic Brain Syndromes", Vol. 5, no. 3, Behavioral Sciences and the Law.
Su. 1987, at page 287:
Organic brain syndromes are of forensic interest for
several reasons. First, patients with organic brain
syndromes may require judicial determination of
competence in any number of areas ... Second, any
patient whose mental state is of legal interest will
need evaluation for contributing organic factors;
uncovering these factors may have considerable
medical and legal consequence. Third, the
discovery of organic factors may be decisive in the
16

outcome of a judicial proceeding, where "hard"
biological data are often accorded more weight, and
are thus more persuasive than "soft" psychological
data.
A copy of the article is attached as Appendix "B" for the Court's convenience.
Because counsel for the appellant does not wish to be perceived as attempting
to argue new facts on appeal, a discussion of the numerous types of Organic
Brain Syndromes will not be undertaken in great detail. However, one final
quote from Dr. Elliot's article will be sufficient to illustrate the ALJ's
undertaking in ruling on medical causation of the appellant's brain damage:
There are many possible etiologies for each organic
brain syndrome. Virtually any medication or
physical illness can conceivably lead to an organic
brain syndrome. A listing of all the possibilities
would be so large as virtually to constitute a table of
contents in a textbook of medicine.
Elliot at 288.
Failure to impanel a medical board can be grounds for reversal by this
Court. Certainly it is grounds for such a reversal according to facts of this
case. The test of whether or not the failure to impanel of a medical board is
error was set out in Hone , supra. At page 1011, the Supreme Court states:
Although referral to the medical panel is not
required by statute, we believe in this case that the
findings of that panel would aid the administrative
law judge. See Champion Home Builders v.
Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah
1985) (evidence of causal connection between
work-related event and the injury may be uncertain
of highly technical whereby failure to refer the case
may be an abuse of discretion).
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[Note that Hone also addresses the fact that a
claimant is not barred simply by the existence of a
pre-existing condition, but that the level of proof
required is higher]
Since the very competency and credibility of the only witness to the
industrial accident in question was at issue, and medical causation was also at
issue, the necessary evidence upon which the ALJ could make any findings
whatsoever was uncertain. The issues involved are highly technical as well.
The facts of this case bring it within the holding in Hone.
The AU, clearly abused his discretion in failing to seek competent and
qualified advice on the subject of organic brain disorders. The expansive
nature of the subject, together with its highly technical testing procedures
requires special counsel and advice to the commission. A copy of some of the
organic brain syndrome tests undertaken by the medical providers of the Mr.
Wilstead has been attached as Appendix "C". I would invite this Court to
examine these test results. They, indeed, speak for themselves, but not in
favor of the ALJ's ruling.
CONCLUSIONS

The ALJ erred in filing to at least compensate Mr. Wilstead for a partial
temporary disability, and in failing to seek competent and qualified medical
counsel by impaneling a medical board. Such requires the vacation of the
Order of the commission, and the entry of new findings, pursuant to the
written guidance of this Court.
Dated this n

day of November, 1989.

DAVID D. PEC&
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APPENDIX "A"

35-1-10. Rules for procedure.
Subject to the provisions of this title, the commission shall adopt and publish rules and regulations governing procedure before it, and shall prescribe
forms of notices and the manner of serving the same in all claims for compensation, and may change the same from time to tame in its discretion. Such
rules and regulations shall include provisions for procedures m the nature of
conferences in order to dispose of cases informally, or to expedite claims adjudication, narrow issues and simplify the methods of proof at hearings.
Hiatory: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 9? OL. 1917,
3069; CX. 1917, § 3130x, added by L.

1919, ch. 63, 5 1; ILS. 1933 & C. 1943,
42-M0? L, 1965, ch. 67, 5 L

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of rules.
Effect of violation of rules.
Filing fflairn

Forfeiture of compensation.
Judicial notice.
Power of commission to promulgate rules.
Presumption on appeal
Rules of evidence.
Rules o£ procedure.
Settlement of claims.
Written application.
Effect of rules.
Injured emplovee who makes application for
compensation to commission is bound to take
notice o( its rules and regulations affecting
that application. Varounas v Industrial
Comm'n. 56 Utah 574, 191 P. 1091 (1920)

proper case validates the unauthorized act, and
is equivalent to original authority for doing it;
but after expiration of tune for filing original
claim, ratification comes too late. Taslich v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 33, 262 P. 281
(1928)

Effect of violation of rules.
Where employee violates rule of Industrial
Commission or disobeys orders of attending
pnysician, or otherwise arbitanly refuses to cooperate with those in attendance upon him. the
award or compensation snould cover only such
period of incapacity or disability as would usually and ordinarily result from character of injury received by employee. Varoukas v. Industrial Comm n. 56 Utah 574,191 P 1091 (1920).
Where injured employee leaves locality of
his employment in violation of rule of Industrial Commission, burden is on such emplovee
to show why his absence has not prejudiced his
employer, or insurance carrier, or state insurance fund, and did not prolong period of his
disability. Varoukas v. Industrial Comm'n, 56
Utah 574, 191 P. 1091 (1920).

Forfeiture of compensation.
Rule which gave Industrial Commission
power to forfeit all compensation wruch accrued to injured emplovee who had left locality
of his employment without any hearing is unreasonable and contrary to spirit of Compensation Act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.). Varoukas v Industrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 574,191 P. 1091 (1920).

Filing **if»i*w
Within the time allowed for filing the original claim, an unauthorized filing thereof may
be ratified by the person in whose behalf it has
been performed, and such ratification in a
Presumption on appeal,
Where claimant did not assail or question
reasonableness or lawfulness of rules of Industrial Commission with reference to compensation claims for hernia. Supreme Court assumed
that such rules are reasonable and lawful.
Staker v. Industrial Comm'n, 61 Utah 11, 209
P. 880 (1922).

Judicial notice.
Supreme Court will not take judicial notice
as to what rules of procedure may have been
adooted or prescribed by the industrial commission. Carter v. Industrial Comm a, 76 Utah
520, 290 P. 776 (1930).
Power of commission to promulgate rules.
Industrial Commission has ample power to
promulgate all reasonable rules and regulations for protection of those who are injured.
and also to protect rights of employer, and that
of insurance carrier, and may saieguard state
insurance fund. Varoukas v Industrial
Comm'n, 56 Utah 574. 191 P. 1091 (1920).
tent with the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.). Carter v.
Industrial Comma, 76 Utah 520, 290 P. 776
(1930).
Settlement of claims.
The commission has the prerogative to adopt
regulations governing the settlement of claims.
Wilburn v. Interstate Elec, 748 P. 2d 582 (CL
App. 1988).

Rules of evidence.
Industrial Commission is not authorized under this section and § 35-1-68 to promulgate
rules prescribing what evidence shall be necessary to warrant recovery in particular cases;
authority to prescribe particular evidence necessary to establish fact is peculiarly within
province of legislature, and involving substantive law, cannot be assumed by commission in
absence of express statutory provision delegating such authority. Livingston v. Industrial
Comm'n. 68 Utah 567, 251 P. 368 (1926).

Written application.
The commission should insist that every applicant comply with its rules by which he is
required to file a written application. Such an
application should be filed in every case and at
least the jurisdictional facts should be stated.
Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comma, 59 Utah
46, 201 P. 1034 (1921)
The application or claim for compensation
must be made by the party entitled to compensation, or by or through some other person
legally authorized to act for him. A claim made
in behalf of a dependent by a mere volunteer
Rules of procedure.
The rules promulgated by the commission binds neither dependent nor employer, and is a
must be reasonable and must conform to the nullity. Taslich v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah
spirit of the Compensation Act (§ 35-1-1 et 33. 262 P. 281 (1927).
seq.). Varoukas v. Industrial Comm n, 56 Utah
A claim for compensation under the Indus574, 191 P. 1091 (1920).
trial Act (5 35-1-1 et seq.) is only one claim, no
Rules of procedure promulgated by commis- matter how many hearings are had or how
sion cannot deprive parties of constitutional many distinct awards are made. It is a claim oy
rights to day in court and of having cause de- the employee for compensation for the injury
termined after impartial hearing. Ocean Acci- he has sustained, notwithstanding the compendent & Guarantee Corp. v Industrial Comm n. sation may be determined from time to time
resulting in many distinct awards. Aetna Life
66 Utah 600, 245 P. 343 (1926).
This section gives the industrial Commission Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comma, 73 Utah 366,
power to adopt rules of procedure not mconsis- 274 P. 139 (1929).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

35-1-19* Investigation of places of employment — Violations of rules or orders — Temporary injunction.
(1) Upon complaint by any person that any employment or place of employment, regardless of the number of persons employed, is not safe or is injurious
to the welfare of any employee, the commission shall proceed, with or without
notice, to make such investigation as may be necessary to determine the
matter complained of. After such investigation, the commission shall enter
such order relative thereto as may be necessary to render such employment or
place of employment safe and not injurious to the welfare of the employees
therein. For any Utah mine subject to the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act, the sole duty of the commission shall be to notify the appropriate federal
agency of the complaint. Whenever the commission shall believe that any
employment or place of employment is not safe or is injurious to the welfare of
any employee, it may, of its own motion, summarily investigate the same,
with or without notice, and issue such order as it may deem necessary to
render such employment or place of employment safe.
(2) Notwithstanding any other penalty provided in this title, if any employer, after receivmg notice, fails or refuses to obey the rules, regulations, or
order of the commission relative to the protection of the life, health, safety, or
welfare of any employee, the district court of Utah is empowered, upon petition of the commission to issue, ex parte and without bond, a temporary
injunction restraining the further operation of the employer's business.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 16, subd. 8;
C.L. 1917, § 3076, subd. 8, L. 1921, ch. 67,
§ 1; fLS 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-17, L. 1945, ch.
65, § 1; 1961, ch. 71, § 1, 1988. ch. 198, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the
previousiy undesignated two paragraphs as
Subsections (1) and (2), inserted the third sen-

tence in Subsection (1) and made a series of
minor punctuation and stylistic changes
throughout the section.
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act- —
Th e Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, ref e r r e d to m the next-to-last sentence in SubsectMa (1)f a p p e a r s as 40 U.S C §§ 801 to 962

C-J.S. — 100 C J.S Workmen s Compensation § 384

Key Numbers. — Workmen s Compensation *» 1090

35-1-29. Depositions.
The commission or any party may in any investigation cause depositions of
witnesses residing within or without the state to be taken as in civil actions.
Cross-References. — Depositions, Rules of
History: L. 1917. ch. 100, § 21; CX. 1917,
I 3081; ILS. 1933, 42-1-27; L. 1939, ch. 51, Civil Procedure, Rules 26 to 37.
§ 1; C. 1943, 42-1-27.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Extraterritorial powers.
Commission has no power to hear evidence
in another state where such procedure is ob-

jected to. McGarry v Industrial Comma. 64
Utah 592, 232 P 1090, 39 A.LJL 306 (1925).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C-J.S. — 100 CJJS. Workmen's Compensation § 384.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
~ 1092.

35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments.
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee
shall receive weekly compensation equal to:
(a) 662h% of the difference between the employee's average weekly
wages before the accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to
earn after the accident, but not more than 100% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of injury; plus
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and S5 for each dependent child under the
age of 18 years, up to a marir""™ of four such dependent children, but
only up to a total weekly compensation that does not exceed 100% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of injury.
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for
work at any time prior to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee:
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally
healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury; and
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-99.
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight years after the date of the injury. Payments shall
terminate when the disability ends or the injured employee dies.
History? C. 1953, 35-1-65.1, enacted by L.
1981, ch~ 287, § 2; 1988, ch. 116, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, designated the
previously undesignated first two paragraphs
as Subsections (1) and (2); in Subsection (1),
divided the formerly undivided language into
an introductory paragraph and Paragraphs (a)
and (b), rewriting the contents thereof; in Subsection (2), divided the formerly undivided language into an introductory paragraph and

Paragraphs (a) and (b), substituted "hearing
under § 35-1-99" for "such purpose prior to the
expiration of such eight-year period" in Paragraph (b) and, in Paragraph (a), substituted
"the injury" for "such injury" and made a
minor punctuation change; deleted the former
last undesignated paragraph, which read "In
no case shall the weekly payments continue
after the disability ends or the death of the
injured employee"; and added Subsection (3).

35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants — Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or
for death, arising out of or m the course of employment, and if the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer
the medical asoects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission. The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to
the medical panel under Section 35-2-56
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission m its
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a
full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate factfinding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function m the same
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may
determine to be necessary or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make a report in writing to the commission m a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission
may require.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full coDies of the report to
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance earner by registered mail
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited
m the United States post ofiice, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is
considered admitted m evidence.
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding.
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing,
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good
cause snown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination.
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted.
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, S 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1969,
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, i 6; 1982, ch. 41,
§ 1; 1988, ch. 116, 5 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, designated the
previously undesignated first sentence as Subsection (l)(a), the previously undesignated second sentence as Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb),
the previously undesignated third and fourth
sentences and the beginning of the previously
undesignated fifth sentence as Subsection
(2)(c), the end of the previously undesignated
fifth sentence as Subsection (2)(d), the previously undesignated sixth and seventh sentencea as Subsection (2)(ej, the previously undesignated eighth sentence as Subsection (2)(f)
and the previously undesignated ninth sentence as Subsection (2Xg) The amendment
also, in Subsection (1), added Paragraph (b)
and, in Paragraph (a), divided the formerly undivided language into two sentences and made
a senes of minor stylistic changes, in Subsecturn (2Xa), inserted "medical director, or medieal consultants" substituted "to be necessary
or desirable" for "and thereafter" and made a

senes of minor stylistic changes; added "The
medical panel, medical director, or medical
consultants shall" at the beginning of Subsection (2Kb), in Subsection (2X0, deleted "of the
panel" following "report" in the first sentence,
maerted "written" in the last two sentences
and made a senes of minor stylistic changes
throughout the subsection, in Subsection (2)(d),
inserted "medical director, or medical consultants", deleted "by the commission" at the end
and made a senes of minor stylistic changes, in
Subsection (2Xe), divided the former first sentence into the present first two sentences, lnserted "the medical director, or the medical
consultants" in the second sentence and "or the
medical director or medical consultants" in the
third sentence and made a senes of minor styhstic changes throughout the subsection, in
Subsection (2X0 inserted "medical director, or
medical consultants" and "at the hearing" and
made a senes of minor stylistic changes, and
rewrote Subsection (2)(g), which read The expenses of such study and report by the medical
panel and of their appearance before the cornmission shall be paid out of the fund provided
by § 35-1-68."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Duty of commission on remand of case.
Effect of 1982 amendment.
Function of medical panel.
Mandatory referral to paneL
Objections to report.
Panel report as evidence.
Qualifications of panel members.
Referral to panel.
—Discretion.
Report, statements and admissions.
Supplemental award.
Cited.
Duty of commission on remand of case.
Where an order of the commission was vacated and the cause remanded because of a deficiency in the evidence to support the report of
a medical panel appointed by the commission,
the commission was not required to make an
award based solely on the plaintiffs evidence;
but it was the responsibility of the commission
to make some disposition of plaintiffs application for an award and it was the prerogative of
the commission to make a determination upon
rights; rather, it governs the process under
which claims are disposed of by the commission. Moore v American Coal Co., 737 P.2d 989
(Utah 1987).
Function of medical paneL
It is the function of the medical panel to give
the commission the benefit of its diagnosis relating to those matters within its expertise,
and not to infringe upon commission s responsibility to decide the issues in a workmen s
compensation case. IGA Food Fair v. Martin,
584 ?J2d 828 (Utah 1978).
Mandatory referral to paneL
This section is mandatory in its requirement
that a medical panel shall be convened upon
the filing of a claim for compensation for injury
bv acaaent, or for death, arising out of or in
the course of employment when the employer
or insurance carrier denies liability Lipman v
Industrial Comma. 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979).
The provision requiring the submission of
the medical aspects of the case, including those
involving causation, to a medical panel is mandatory Schmidt v Industrial Comm'n, 617
PM 693 (Utah 1980).
Objections to report.
Where plaintiff filed written objections to
the report of a medical panel wmch had been
appointed by the commission and objected to
the report at the hearings, the burden was on
the commission or the employer to sustain the
report by oral testimony and. where this was
not done, the report could not be considered as
evidence. Hackford v Industrial Comm'n, 11
Utah 2d 312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961)
Where industrial commission had granted
medical expenses from time of claimant's injury to June 13, 1962, and workmen's compensation to and including February 12, 1962, it
did not act arbitrarily in denying payments for
any later periods, the evidence at the hearing
on objections to report of medical panel showing that hospitalization on January 18, 1962,
was made necessary by accident in course of
claimant's employment causing temporary loss
of control of claimant's diabetes; total temporary disability ceased on claimant's return to
work initially following accident; there was no
permanent disability; and further medical
treatment was not needed as the result of the
accident. Sanderson v. Industrial Comm'n, 16
Utah 2d 348, 400 P^d 756 (1965).
Panel report a* evidence.
In denying workmen's compensation benefits
to claimant. Industrial Commission did not err
in considering report of medical panel appointed by commission along with other evidence; medical panel and report did not encroach upon authority vested in commission to
make findings of fact and conclusions. Jensen

the evidence in the light of the decision of the
Supreme Court or to order and hold a supplemental hearing to allow the parties to present
additional evidence. Hackford v. Industrial
Commn, 12 Utah 2d 250, 364 P.2d 1091
(1961).
Effect of 1982 amendment
The 1982 amendment of this section, malpng
the granting of a hearing discretionary, does
not enlarge or destroy vested or contractual
v United States Fuel Co., 18 Utah 2d 414, 424
P.2d 440 (1967).
In determining that order of commission
denying award was supported by sufficient evidence, question whether panel report submitted to commission should be considered as evidence was of no importance where one of panel
members appeared and testified beiore commission, and that testimony alone was sufficient to sustain order of commission.
McWilliams v Industrial Coram n, 21 Utah 2d
266, 444 PJ2d 513 (1968)
Although great respect must be paid to panel
of medical experts appointed pursuant to this
section, they are not ultimate finders of fact
but rather reporters or medical aspects of given
case in aid of Industrial Commissions appraisal and weighing of all facts; therefore,
where commission aaopted panel's conclusion
which was unsupported bv any credible or competent evidence, commission s award of benefits was reversed. Redman Warehousing Corp.
v Industrial Commn, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454
P2d 283 (1969)
Where expert opinion of medical panel that
was adopted by the commission was based on
incorrect factual foundation assuming no prior
history of bacx pathology, there was insufficient evidence to sustain the aware; and when
new evidence of pnor history was obtained,
matter was remanded to commission so that
medical panel could reconsider its findings
based on the new information. Utah Packers,
Inc. v Industrial Comm n, 24 Utah 2d 230, 469
P.2d 500 (1970)
Although all other evidence and testimony
indicated that the plaintiff was totally disabled, report of the meoical panel that plaintiff
had suffered a 50% permanent partial disability is sufficient to support finding of industrial
commission of a partial disability Shipley v C
& W Contracting Co„ 528 P^d 153 (Utah
1974).
It is the duty of the commission to consider
not only the medical panel report, but also all
of the other evidence, and to draw whatever
inferences and deductions than can be fairly
and reasonabiya derived therefrom in reaching
a decision on the issues. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 PJ2d 828 (Utah 1978)
Although medical panel report did not link
employee s heart attack with the stress he had
experienced four days earlier at his job, the
commiasion's finding that there was a causal
connection between the stress and the subsequent heart attack was neither arbitrary or capricious and not without any substantial evidence to support it where a cardiologist testified that there was in fact A causal link between the stress and the heart attack. Pittsburgh Testing Lab. v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367
(Utah 1983).

Qualification* of panel members.
Statutory requirement that medical panel
member specialize in "treatment of the disease" was met where practice consisted of
representing businesses and teaching, even
though physician did not actually treat patients on an appointment basis. Edwards v.
TOlery, 671 P.2d 195 (Utah 1983).
Referral to paneL
—Discretion.
As the evidence of the causal connection between an employee lifting a very heavy beam
and the perforation of his ulcer was not uncertain or highly technical, the failure to refer the
case to a medical panel was not an abuse of
discretion, Champion Home Bldrs. v. Industrial Comm'n, 703 P.2d 306 (Utah 1985).
Report, statements and admissions.
In a proceeding for supplemental award of
workmen's compensation for deterioration of
condition caused by original injury where the
commission had appointed a medical panel to
make an independent investigation and report
for the guidance of the commission, neither
party was bound by any statement or admission made either m the report or in the testi-

mony of the chairman of the panel a doctor, in
support of the report. Mollerup Van Lines v.
Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235, 398 P.2d 882 (1965).
In proceeding by widow of deceased oil
dnller to recover compensation for his death
from coronary occlusion on ground that death
was caused by inhalation of fumes while mixing mud compound designed to flush out
clogged pipes during oil drilling operations, the
industrial commission did not have to accept
the most probable of three theories advanced
as possibilities by the panel. Williams v. Industrial Comma, 17 Utah 2d 169, 406 P.2d 707
(1965).
Supplemental award.
Supplemental award of workmen s compensation for deterioration of condition caused by
original injury was properly granted by the
commission where evidence of the medical
panel, appointed by the commission, showed
that claimant's subsequent injuries had not advanced deterioration of condition resulting
from original injury Mollerup Van Lines v
Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235, 398 P 2d 882 (1965).
Cited in Hone v J J Shea Co., 728 P2d
1008 (Utah 1986); Greyhound Lines v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 590.
A.L.R. — Workmen s compensation: u«e of
medical books or treatises as independent evidence, 17 A-L^.3d 993.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
«» 1694

35-1-85.1. Depositions of witnesses authorized.
The commission or any party to a proceeding under this act may cause
depositions of witnesses to be taken as in civil actions.
History: C. 1953, 35-1*35, enacted by L.
1965, en. 67, § 1.

Meaning of "this act". — See same catchline in notes following § 35-1-46.

35-1-91. Physical examinations.
Any employee claiming the right to receive compensation under this title
may be required by the commission, or its medical examiner, to submit himself for medical examination at any time, and from time to time, at a place
reasonably convenient for such employee, and such as may be provided by the
rules of the commission. If such employee refuses to submit to any such examination, or obstructs the same, his right to have his claim for compensation
considered, if his claim is pending before the commission, or to receive any
payments for compensation theretofore granted, shall be suspended during
the period of such refusal or obstruction.
History: I* 1917, ch. 100, § 91; O L . 1917,
§ 3152; L. 1921, cfa. 67, § 1; ILS. 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-85.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Additional compensation.
Duty of employee to submit to operation.
Duty to submit to treatment.
Refusal of medical treatment.
Additional compensation.
Order of Industrial Commission denying additional compensation on ground workman had
not become totally and permanently disabled
since original finding and award for temporary
disability would be affirmed although medical
testimony was in conflict since mere failure to
recover within six-year period after an accident is not conclusive that injury is permanent
and total. Spencer v. Industrial Comma, 97
Utah 140, 91 ?2A 439 (1939),
Duty of employee to submit to operation.
When a disability can be prevented or removed by a minor and safe operation, or by
safe medical treatment, then it is injured employee's duty to submit thereto, and refusal to
do so will defeat his claim for compensation for
disability caused thereby. The commission may
consider ail the facts and circumstances surrounding the refusal in determining whether
applicant acted reasonably or unreasonably in
refusing to submit to treatment, American
Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Industrial Comma, 76
Utah 503, 290 P. 770 (1930).
Duty to submit to treatment.
The injured employee must submit to proper

treatment, either medical or surgical, when it
mvolves so serious risk or suffering and wnen
it is such as a man of ordinary manly character
would undergo for his own good. American
Smelting & fe£. Co. v. Industrial Comma, 76
Utah 503. 290 P. 770 (1930).
Refusal of medical treatment.
If an injured employee unreasonably refuses
to submit to prooer medical treatment and as a
result thereof his disability or injury is rendered greater or permitted to continue, then
such disability or injury as is caused by such
unreasonable refusal is attributable to voluntary act of employee and not to the accident. In
determining what constitutes a reasonable or
an unreasonable refusal to submit to medical
treatment, the facts and circumstances of the
particular case must be inquired into. American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
76 Utah 503, 290 P. 770 (1930).
Refusal of employee to submit to necessary
and proper medical treatment for his injury because he is timid and probably oversensitive to
pain, constitutes no excuse for his refusal.
American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 76 Utah 503, 290 P. 770 (1930).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
GJ.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 484.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
e» 1314.

35-1-92. Autopsy in death cases — Authority of commission — Certified pathologist — Public record —
Attending physicians — Penalty for refusal to
permit — Liability.
On the filing of a claim for compensation for death within the provisions of
this act where, in the opinion of the commission it is necessary to accurately
and scientifically ascertain the cause of death, an autopsy may be ordered by a
majority of the commission and shall be made by a person designated by the
commission,, The commission shall determine who shall pay the charge of the
certified pathologist making the autopsy. Any person interested may designate a duly licensed physician to attend such autopsy, and the findings of the
certified pathologist performing the autopsy shall be filed with the commission and shall be a public record. All proceedings for compensation shall be
suspended upon refusal of a claimant or claimants to permit such autODsy
when so ordered. Where an autopsy has been performed pursuant to an order
of a majority of the commission no cause of action shall lie against any person,
firm or corporation for participating in or requesting such autopsy.
History: C. 1943, 42-1-85.10, added by L.
1949, chc 52, § 2; L. 1975, ch. 64, § 4.

Meaning of "thia act". — See same catchline in notes following § 35-1-46.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C<J.Sc —• 100 CJ.So Workmen'! Compenaation § 485.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
•» 1315.

35-1-94. Employer's records subject to examination —
Penalty.
All books, records, and payrolls of an employer showing, or reflecting in any
way upon, the amount of his wage expenditure shall always be open for inspection by the commission, or any of its auditors, inspectors, or assistants, for
the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of the wage expenditure, the number of individuals employed, and such other information as may be necessary
for the uses and purposes of the commission in its administration of the law. If
an employer refuses to submit any books, records, or payrolls for inspection,
after being presented with written authority from the commission, he is liable
for a penalty of $100 for each offense. This penalty shall be collected by a avil
action and paid into the Injury Fund administered by the Workers' Compensation Fund.
History: L. 1917, cfa. 100, § 92; CJL 1917,
§ 3153; ILS. 1933 & C. 1943,42-1-87; L. 1977,
ch. 151, § 8; 1988, ch. 56, § L
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July i, 1988, divided the former
second sentence into the present last two sen-

tences, rewriting the contents thereof, and
made a series of minor stylistic changes
throughout the first sentence.
Cross-References. — Injury Fund, § 35-32.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 100 C J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 384

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
•» 1090.

35-1-98. Control of physicians.
All physicians and surgeons attending injured employees shall comply with
all of the rules and regulations, including the schedule of fees for their services, adopted by the commission? and shall make reports to the commission at
any and all times as required by it as to the condition or treatment of any
injured employee, or as to any other matters concerning cases in which they
are employed A copy of the first report shall be mailed to the injured employee. Any physician or surgeon who refuses or neglects to make any report
required by this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a
fine of not more than $500 for such offense.
History; L> 1917, ch> 100, § 95; OL. 1917,
§ 3156; L» 1919, ch. 63, § 1; ILS. 1933,

42-1-91; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-91;
L. 1967, ch- 66, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Admissibility of testimony.
Form of report.
Admissibility of testimony.
Where company doctor's testimony was
based upon report by X-ray specialist to company doctor as to what, in his opinion, appliForm of report.
The attending physician makes his report on
a printed blank furnished for that purpose in

cant was suffering from,
admitted as an exception
Uta-Carbon Coal Co. v.
104 Utah 567, 140 P.2d

such testimony was
to the hearsay rule,
Industrial Comm'n,
649 (1943).

which he describes the injury. Utah Delaware
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 187,
289 P. 94 (1930).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
CJ-S< — 99 C J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 266.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
~ 979.
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An Introduction to Organic Brain
Syndromes
Richard L. Elliott, M.D., Ph.D.

Organic brain syndromes are of forensic interest for several reasons.
First, patients with organic brain syndromes may require judicial determination of competence in any of a number of areas, e.g., testamentary capacity,
need for financial guardianship, or competence to make medical decisions.
Second, any patient whose mental state is of legal interest will need evaluation for contributing organic factors; uncovering these factors may have considerable medical and legal consequence. Third, the discovery of organic factors may be decisive in the outcome of a judicial proceeding, where "hard"
biological data are often accorded more weight, and are thus more persuasive, than "soft" psychological data. This article provides an introductory
overview of the organic brain syndromes. For each syndrome, the clinical
features are described and are illustrated with a case vignette, the more common etiologies are presented, and selected aspects to the evaluation are highlighted. In addition, since the detection of malingered mental illness is a key
component in many forensic contexts, characteristics are described which
help to distinguish actual from malingered mental illness.
INTRODUCTION
Examples in which patients with organic brain syndromes impinge upon the
legal system are numerous. Civil issues of testamentary capacity, need for
guardianship, and competence to accept or refuse medical treatment arise not
infrequently with these patients. In the area of criminal law, evaluations for
criminal responsibility and fitness to stand trial very often need to consider the
possibility of an organic brain syndrome. Personal injury cases involving possible injury to the brain represent still another arena in which evaluation for
the presence of an organic brain syndrome is important.
Richard L. Elliott, M.D., Ph.D., formerly fellow in Law and Psychiatry, Section on
Psychiatry and the Law, Rush-Prcsbyterlan-St. Luke's Medical Center, is affiliated with the
Department of Psychiatry and Health Behavior, Medical College of Georgia. Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Richard Elliott, MD., Ph.. D., Department of Psychiatry and
Health Behavior, Medical College of Georgia, Augusta, GA 30912-7300.
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This review is written in order to provide an introduction to organic brain
syndromes. Each of the organic brain syndromes recognized in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual, third edition (DSM-III)(American Psychiatric Association, 1980), is discussed with respect to diagnosis, clinical features, and
etiologies. Emphasis is placed on those parts of the evaluation that are most
pertinent to a forensic setting. Case vignettes illustrate common examples of
the ways in which organic brain syndromes may present forensically.
Before considering the individual organic brain syndromes, a few general
remarks may be helpful. First, the words "organic" and "brain" convey the
idea that these mental disorders are thought to be caused by physical (organic)
processes affecting the brain. This distinguishes them from the so called "functional" disorders such as schizophrenia and the affective (mood) disorders, in
which a psychological explanation is thought to provide a better basis for the
cause of the illness. Although this distinction between organic and functional
disorders is time honored, a broader, biopsychosocial view of each illness
which considers biological, psychological, and social factors is necessary for a
complete understanding. For the organic brain syndromes, this means that the
psychological and social aspects of the illness must not be neglected. For example, a patient with dementia, an organic brain syndrome, may have a
profound psychological reaction to the illness and become depressed in addition to demented.
A second preliminary comment concerns the distinction between organic
brain syndromes and organic mental disorders. An organic brain syndrome is a
collection of psychiatric signs and symptoms whose etiology is thought to be
organic, but is not specified. Thus dementia is an organic brain syndrome. An
organic mental disorder is an organic brain syndrome whose etiology is known
or presumed. The organic brain syndrome dementia, which is thought to be
due to progressive degenerative dementia (Alzheimer's Disease), is an organic
mental disorder.
There are many possible organic etiologies for each organic brain syndrome.
Virtually any medication or physical illness can conceivably lead to an organic
brain syndrome. A listing of all the possibilities for any organic brain
syndrome would be so large as virtually to constitute a table of contents in a
textbook of medicine. Therefore, only the more common etiologies will be included in the following discussion.
Since many of the same etiologies can lead to different organic brain
syndromes, e.g. J head trauma can cause an organic personality syndrome,
dementia, or an amnestic syndrome, parts of the evaluation, including history
taking, physical examination, and laboratory testing will be common to the
various syndromes. In order to forego listing these for each separate evaluation, this basic evaluation for organic brain syndromes is listed in Table I (see,
for example, Wells, 1985). Under the individual organic brain syndromes,
only the special features of the particular evaluation will be noted.
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TABLE I Evaluation of Organic Brain Syndromes
History:
illnesses, medications, alcoholism, head trauma
Examination: physical, neurologic and mental status examinations
Laboratory: CT scan or Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the head, chest x-ray, complete blood
count, chemistry survey, urinalysis, toxicologic screening, vitamin B12 and folic
acid levels, serology for syphilis

Neuropsychological testing is an important part of the evaluation for most
organic brain syndromes. It consists of a battery of tests administered by a
qualified neuropsychologist, preferably one with forensic experience. The tests
help to localize lesions within the brain, ascertain the extent of organic
deficits, and determine character trails which are important to the psychological understanding of the individual. Furthermore, and some times more importantly, some of the neuropsychological tests help to determine when an individual is feigning, exaggerating, or denying psychological symptoms.
Wasyliw and Golden (1985) have provided a review of forensic neuropsychological testing.
DEMENTIA
Dementia is the most common of the organic brain syndromes, affecting
five percent of adults over age 65 severely and another 10% to a moderate degree (Blazer, 1983). Synonyms for dementia include chronic organic brain
syndrome and, because of its association with increasing age, "senility." The
hallmark of dementia is global deterioration in intellectual ability affecting
more than one area of performance. Deterioration is an important component
to the definition of dementia, as it distinguishes dementia from syndromes in
which impaired intellectual ability is present from birth. In addition, the impairment must be severe enough to cause difficulties in social or occupational
functioning. The presence of findings on a mental status examination, in the
absence of social or occupation dysfunction, is not sufficient to make a diagnosis of dementia.
The current diagnostic criteria according to DSM-III are shown in Table II.
Memory impairment is a hallmark of dementia and usually consists of difficulties with either short-term (minutes) or recent (days or weeks) memory.
Remote (many years) memory is often relatively preserved. Short-term
memory is tested by asking the patient to remember the names of several unrelated objects. After a period of several minutes, the patient is asked to recall
the objects. Most people can recall two or three objects after several minutes.
Alternatively, the patient can be told a short story, which, after several
minutes, he is asked to retell. Recent memory is tested by asking the patient
about events which have taken place hours or days prior to the examination.
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A. A loss of intellectual abilities of sufficient severity to interfere with social or occupational functioning.
B. Memory impairment
C. At least one of the following:
(1) impairment of abstract thinking, as manifested by concrete interpretation of
proverbs, inability to find similarities and differences between related words,
difficulty in defining words and concepts, and other similar tasks.
(2) impaired judgment
(3) other disturbances of higher cortical function, such as aphasia (disorder of language due to brain dysfunction), apraxia (inability to carry out motor activities
despite intact comprehension and motor function), agnosia (failure to recognize
or identify objects despite intact sensory function), "constructional difficulty"
(e.g., inability to copy three-dimensional figures, assemble blocks or arrange
sticks in specific designs)
(4) personality change, i.e., alteration or accentuation of premorbid trails
D. State of consciousness not clouded (i.e., does not meet the criteria for delirium or intoxication, although these may be superimposed).
E. Either (1) or (2):
(1) evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory tests, of a
specific organic factor that is judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance
(2) in the absence of such evidence, an organic factor necessary for the development of the syndrome can be presumed if conditions other than organic mental
disorders have been reasonably excluded and if the behavioral change represents cognitive impairment in a variety of areas.

This should be information which can be verified, such as meals, visitors,
medicaJ tests, or current events. More precise testing of memory functioning is
done with the aid of neuropsychological testing.
The capacity to think in an abstract manner is tested by asking the patient to
interpret proverbs, taking into account the patients' previous intellectual and
educational background. A patient who interprets the proverb "what docs <still
waters run deep> mean?" as "nothing changed, they arc still waters," is
responding in a concrete and not abstract manner. Other disorders in which
concrete thinking is evident include schizophrenia and mental retardation.
Judgment is the capacity for solving personal and social problems. Someone
who makes inappropriate sexual comments to a stranger, or makes a will leaving die estate to a stranger, is generally thought to be showing impaired judgment. Since most legal difficulties arise from a patients' impaired judgment, it
is important to evaluate the patients' capacity in this area. This is generally
done by determining the patients' actual responses to events in his life. Examples of impaired judgment include dressing inappropriately and wandering
about carrying large sums of money. Occasionally a hypothetical situation
might be presented to a patient such as asking him to slate what he would do
if he discovered a fire in a crowded movie theater.
Personality changes art common in dementia, with paranoia being the most
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW

common. Because of their forgetfulness, patients may forget where they put a
particular object. After having lost a number of objects, a patient might begin
to believe that someone has been stealing them. It is easier for some patients
to accept the idea that objects are being stolen, rather than to acknowledge
their failing memory. Other delusions may arise as the patient attempts to explain the disorder and confusion he or she is experiencing.
Other disturbances in functioning are common in dementia. The patient may
have an apraxia, that it, a difficulty carrying out motor tasks despite intact
muscle strength and coordination. An example of a patient with an apraxia is a
women I saw who was accusing her landlord of stealing her keys and replacing them with others that did not fit. When I asked her to demonstrate die
"wrong key" she attempted to put the key in the door upside down, and even
after multiple attempts, was unable to recognize that simply reversing the key
would have worked. Another common disturbance in dementia is aphasia, a
difficulty with written and spoken language. Patients may have difficulties
finding words for common objects and become considerably frustrated when
they are unable to express themselves.
The course of dementia varies greatly with the etiology. The onset may be
insidiously slow as in Progressive degenerative dementia (Alzheimer's Disease), or sudden, following head trauma or severe sustained lack of oxygen to
the brain. Once established, the dementia may be relatively stable, such as that
following anoxia, slowly progressive over a number of years as in
Alzheimer's Disease, or rapidly progressive over several months to several
years as in a dementia due to an infectious etiology such as Jacob-Creutzfeld's
disease.
Dementia has many possible causes, but by far the most common, accounting for about 50% of all dementias, is Progressive degenerative dementia
(Alzheimer's Disease). Its onset is typically in the seventh or eighth decade
but occasionally appears in younger or older individuals. As noted above, it
usually begins gradually, with mild memory loss or subtle personality changes
frequently marking die onset of the disease. The early memory changes are
often minimized by die patient, who may explain them as "anyone can forget
once in a while," or "my memory has never been very good." The personality
changes may be as subtle as an increase in irritability or depression. Anomer
early sign of Alzheimer's Disease is an increase in difficulty adjusting to new
situations. An employee who has performed well for a number of years may
have increasing difficulty solving commonplace problems, and may be unable
to adapt to changes at home or work. This can be enormously frustrating and
may lead to potentially violent outbursts in a normally docile person.
Changes in personal care are often noted in the early stages of dementia.
Personal cleanliness and grooming may suffer, offensive habits may appear,
and there may be a deterioration of housekeeping.
The later stages of Alzheimer's Disease are maiked by further deterioration
in memory, personality, self-care, and judgment. In die final stages, the patient
may be bedridden, lose control of bladder and bowel and speak unintelligibly.
VOL. 5, NO 3 • 1987

The etiology of Alzheimer's Disease is unknown. There is an increased risk
of Alzheimer's Disease in the children of an affected parent, but genetic factors play a role in a minority of patients. Attempts to identify an environmental or infectious agent have been intriguing though inconclusive (Mozar, 1987).
Other common causes of dementia include multiinfarct dementia (due to
multiple small strokes), normal pressure hydrocephalus, dementia secondary to
chronic alcoholism, vitamin deficiency, hypothyroidism or hyperthyroidism,
.tertiary syphilis, head trauma, brain tumor, or other intracranial masses. Some
medications have produced a clinical picture of dementia e.g., anticholinergics,
analgesics, antihypertensives, cimetidine, lithium, disulfiram, and digitalis.
These and other causes of dementia are discussed more comprehensively elsewhere (Wells, 1977).
A final "cause" of dementia is depression, which leads to a pseudo-demented state which may mimic that of dementia. Depression can lead to difficulties with memory and concentration, changes in personality, and deterioration in personal care. However, these changes in depression are due to a lack
of interest or effort, rather than a lack of ability. Improving the patient's effort
either with pharmacotherapy or psychotherapy, results in a lifting of the
depression and the disappearance of "dementia" (Wells, 1979).
Evaluation of a suspected dementia consists primarily of the items listed in
Table I. The focus of the evaluation is the search for potentially treatable
causes of dementia; approximately 15% of dementias arc completely or partially reversible (Popkin & MacKenzie, 1985). Historical information of particular importance includes a history of head trauma, use of medications,
thyroid disease, or syphilis. A complete physical and neurological evaluation
is necessary. Laboratory tests should include all of those listed in Table I, with
particular emphasis on a brain scan, either via computed tomography or magnetic resonance imaging, thyroid function tests, a urine drug screen, and a test
for syphilis. Tests not included in Table I which might be pursued include
screening for heavy metals, an electroencephalogram (EEG) and a lumbar
puncture.
Case One
The points contested in this case were four codicils to the will of an old
gentleman, on the grounds that at the lime of taking them he was incapable by reason of mental decay of understanding their nature and effect. It was testified...that during the two or three years within which the
codicils were made he frequently did not know people with whom he had
previously been well acquainted, without being told who they were; that
he would go about the house and garden looking around and appearing
not to know what he was about. On one occasion he not only did not
recognize a certain person but could not be made to understand who he
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was, and it was tesuueu Dy a very uiuereiu KHIU UI wmicsa ma* u> ^
deceased asked him how old was the witness's father (though he had
been dead 16 years and had been his partner in business), and soon after
he inquired of the witness after his health as if he were addressing
another person. Several similar lapses in memory and various appearances of childishness in his conduct were also revealed by the evidence
amply sufficient no doubt to induce superficial observers to believe that
he was mentally incapacitated from disposing of property. It appeared,
however, that he was in the habit of giving in favor of his brother's butler, drafts accurately signed and filled up; that at Christmas lime he gave
the servants Chrisunas boxes and the usual amount of money, and entered
die sums in his account book; that he received a farmer's bills for corn
and paid them with drafts on his banker which he wrote himself, going
through the whole business correctly and dial he docketed the bills and
receipts on the back with the name of the person to whom paid, and die
amount of the bill making corresponding entries also in his private account book; that he signed 20 drafts at least one morning for payment of
his brother's debts without instruction or assistance, subscribing his own
name as executor of his brother, that we would detect errors in the casting up of other people's account; that he discharged his physician's bills
correctly; and in short dial he managed his affairs and that prudently and
correctly, to the last. It was also testified diat it was his practice to read
aloud to the family the psalms and lessons of the day; dial he was fond of
a litUe fun and played at whist remarkably well. That a person might have
done all of this and yet been unsound in mind, is certainly not impossible;
but it was far beyond die power of mind so broken up by old age and die
invasion of disease as to being capable of altering testamentary deposition
previously made. This consideration and the fact that die circumstances of
the case furnish abundant reasons for the alteration, induced court to
decide in favor of the capacity of die testator.

This case, taken from Isaac Ray's seminal Treatise on the Medical
Jurisprudence of Insanity (Ray, 1902) illustrates a common forensic problem
in which dementia is a consideration, testamentary capacity. This case further
illustrates that while the subject may have had some impairment in his
memory, orientation, and "childishness in his conduct," there was abundant
evidence that he had not lost the capacity to make sound financial decisions.
Thus, a finding of the presence of dementia in this patient was not sufficient
to demonstrate lack of testamentary capacity. Some areas of intellectual performance, especially in the early stages of dementia, are relatively spared.
Whereas dementia ultimately involves generalized deterioration in multiple
areas of functioning Uiere are other organic brain syndromes which involve
changes in relatively circumscribed aspects. These syndromes comprise the
next section of the article, and include organic personality syndrome, amnestic
syndrome, organic hallucinosis, and organic delusional syndrome. In some
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iviagnosijc untena for Organic Personalily Syndrome
A. A marked change in behavior or personality involving at least one of die following:
1) emotional lability, e.g., explosive temper outbursts, sudden crying; 2) impairment
in impulse control, e.g., poor social judgment, sexual indiscretions, shop lifting; 3)
marked apathy and indifference, e.g., no interest in usual hobbies; 4) suspiciousness
or paranoid ideation.
B. No clouding of consciousness as in delirium; no significant loss of intellectual
abilities, as in dementia; no predominant disturbance of mood, as in organic affective syndrome; no predominant delusions or hallucinations as in organic delusional
syndrome or organic hallucinosis.
C. Evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory test of a specific organic factor that is judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance.
O. This diagnosis is not given to a child or adolescent, if the clinical picture is limited
to the features that characterize attention deficit disorder.

cases, these syndromes are relatively stable over time; in others they represent
early stages of dementia, and progressively worsen.

ORGANIC PERSONALITY SYNDROME
The essential feature of this syndrome is a change in personality due to organic factors, but not due to another organic brain syndrome such as dementia
The DSM-III diagnostic criteria are shown in Table III.

Case Two
Phineas Gage was a strong, healthy and popular foreman of a railroad excavation crew. While working at a she, an explosion drove an iron bar
into the left side of his face, existing through the top of the skull. He
quickly regained consciousness and was treated by a physician. Remarkably enough, there was no residual impairment except for dramatic personality changes. He was described by his physician as "fitful, irreverent,
indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was not previously his
custom), manifesting but little deference to his fellows, impatient of
restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at time pertinatiously
obstinate yet capricious and vacillating, devising many plans for future
operation which no sooner are arranged than they are abandoned in turn
for others appearing more feasible. His mind was radically changed so
that his friends and acquaintances said he was no longer Gage." (Harlow,
1868).

The type of personality changes seen in this disorder are primarily related to
the location of damage to the brain. For example, damage to the frontal lobes
may result in "pseudopsychopathic" personality changes. A hard working, law
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW

TABLE IV Diagnostic Criteria for Intermittent Explosive Disorder
A. Several discrete episodes of loss of control of aggressive impulses resulting in
serious assault or destruction of property.
H. Behavior that is grossly out of proportion to any precipitating psychosocial stressor.
C. Absence of signs and generalized impulsivity or aggressiveness between episodes.
D. Not due to schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder or conduct disorder.

abiding citizen such as Phineas Gage might become belligerent, impulsive,
sexually indiscreet, and may come to the attention of auworities as the result
of antisocial behavior. Damage to another part of the frontal lobes may lead to
an apathetic, indifferent depressed appearance. In some patients with damage
to the temporal lobes, there is a tendency to humorless verbosity in speech and
an increase in religiosity and aggressiveness.
A change in the organic personality syndrome proposed for the revised edition of DSM-IH, to be published in 1987, is die inclusion of intermittent explosive disorder. The diagnostic criteria for intermittent explosive disorder are
shown in Table IV.
In DSM-III, intermittent explosive disorder is listed as a disorder of impulse
control. This classification, however, does not take into account experimental
data supporting die hypothesis that die disorder results from an irritable electrical focus in the limbic system. The limbic system, which lies deep within die
brain, is responsible for some of our most basic responses such as a fight or
flight' response to danger, feeding, and sexuality. Stimulation of parts of die
limbic system have been shown to produce rage attacks in susceptible individuals. In some patient widi intermittent explosive disorder, electrodes have
been planted deep within the brain to record stimuli in the limbic system. In
diese patients, an irritable focus was found which seemed to trigger the explosive episodes. Aside from the diagnostic criteria in Table IV, clinical indicators suggesting an intermittent explosive disorder include a history of
physical assaults, especially wife and child beatings; padiological intoxication;
a history of impulsive sexual behavior, at times including sexual assaults; and
a history of many traffic violations and automobile accidents. (Mark & Ervin,
1970)
This diagnosis is particularly appealing to defense attorneys. Its use has
been advocated in insanity evaluations to explain impulsive violent behavior
(Ratner, 1979). However, before making the diagnosis, the clinician should
consider whether a particular violent act was part of a general pattern of impulsive antisocial behavior, or whether it truly represented a relatively isolated explosive episode in the life of a normally peaceful person.
Some of the more common causes of organic personality syndrome include
damage to the frontal or temporal lobes secondary to head trauma or tumor;
temporal lobe epilepsy (complex partial or psychomotor seizures); metabolic
derangements such as hypoglycemia, hypo- or hypercalcemia or hyponatremia; and Huntington's disease.
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Jn addition to the evaluation outlined in Table I, for intermittent explosive
disorder an electroencephalogram (EEC) is often useful, particularly wilh
respect to the need for anticonvulsant treatment. Neuropsychological testing
may help to document the presence of dysfunctional personality traits and is
useful in ruling out the presence of other signs of organic brain disease. Perhaps the most important part of the evaluation is collateral information from
sources such as families, employers, teachers, and the military in order to
document pre-existing personality traits. It is not the existence of pathological
personality trails per se which indicate this organic brain syndrome; rather, it
is a documented change in personality which is necessary to make the diagnosis.
AMNESTIC SYNDROME
For an accurate memory to be created, an event must be perceived accurately. An event is detected by sensory organs, registered as such in the cerebral
cortex, preserved for at least several minutes as a short-term memory, and
retained as a long-term memory. In addition, the presence of a memory can
not be detected unless memory recall is intact. When these processes are disrupted, the result is anterograde or retrograde amnesia. Anterograde amnesia is
a deficit in the ability to learn new material. Its presence is tested for by
giving the patient several words or a short paragraph to remember and asking
him to recall it after several minutes. Retrograde amnesia, an inability to recall
previously learned material, is tested by asking the patient to recall events
from his life, and to recall previously learned historical events such as the
names of presidents. Overlearned material, such as one's birth place, is relatively resistant to amnesia and is not a sensitive test for the presence of amnestic syndrome.
Organic causes of amnesia usually indicate damage to structures lying
within or near the limbic system, the major stiuctures being the hippocampus,
fornix, medullary bodies, and parts of the thalamus. The most common causes
of amnesia in a nonintoxicated individual is brain damage due to the effects of
chronic alcoholism and thiamine deficiency, i.e., Korsakoff's syndrome. In
this syndrome, there is a devastating effect on anterograde memory, with relative preservation of retrograde memory. Thus the patient is able to perceive
and register information (he is alert and is able to repeat a series of digits),
but, after several minutes, he is no longer able to remember it. Because of difficulties forming new memory, the patient becomes disoriented when placed in
new surroundings, e.g., a jail or hospital.
Diagnostic criteria for the Amnestic Syndrome are give in Table V. Although not part of these criteria, an interesting clinical feature, particularly in
the early stages, is the presence of confabulation. Confabulation is the creation
of stories, sometimes fantastic, to fill in the gaps in the patient's memory. 1
once asked a hospitalized patient with Korsakoff's syndrome what he had
eaten for dinner the night before. He responded that he had gone to a "meeting
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW

TABLE V Diagnostic Criteria for Amnestic Syndrome
A. Both short-term memory impairment (inability to learn new information) and longterm memory impairment (inability to remember information that was known in the
past) are the predominant clinical features.
B. No clouding of consciousness, as in delirium and intoxication, or general loss of
major intellectual abilities, as in dementia.
C. Evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory tests of a specific organic factor that is judged to be etiotogically related to the disturbance.

of the Polish Falcon Club for a pig fry." It is important to realize that the
patient is unaware that what he is saying is false. This distinguishes confabulation from lying, which is done intentionally in order to deceive.
In addition to the effects of chronic alcoholism and thiamine deficiency,
other causes of amnestic syndrome include head trauma, herpes simplex encephalitis, transient global amnesia, other vitamin deficiencies, and amnesia
following surgery or electroconvulsive therapy (Benson & Blumer, 1982). Amnestic syndrome due to head trauma is often forensically important, and is
predominandy anterograde amnesia, so that memory is lost for events which
occurred following the injury. In addition there may be a mild retrograde amnesia for events occurring prior to the injury which tends to improve with time.
The most common manner in which amnesia becomes a forensic issue is
during an evaluation for criminal responsibility or fitness to stand trial. In
these contexts, the examiner must decide whether the amnesia, usually
retrograde for the events in question, is the result of organic causes, is pyschogenic, or is the result of malingering. Amnesia due to organic causes is differentiated from psychogenic amnesia and malingering by the factors shown in
Table VI. Outside of a forensic setting, secondary gain is most prominent in
feigned (malingered) amnesia, is often present in psychogenic amnesia, but is
relatively uncommon in organic amnesia. However, in a forensic setting,
secondary gain may be prominent in all three conditions. During a sodium
Amytal interview, during which the barbiturate sodium amobarbital is administered intravenously, the patient wiUi organic amnesia will often experience a worsening of his amnesia. The memory of a patient with
psychogenic amnesia is often improved during an Amytal interview. Patients
with feigned amnesia maynot reveal their true intention during a sodium Amytal interview. In organic amnesia, there is loss of information relating to personal as well as nonpersonal events. In psychogenic amnesia lost memories
are of events of a personal nature. Persons feigning amnesia will often claim
to have forgotten all events, personal and nonpersonal. New learning is often
impaired in organic amnesia, particularly in illnesses such as thiamine deficiency and chronic alcoholism. New learning is usually not impaired in amnesia
due to head trauma or transient global amnesia. In psychogenic amnesia and
feigned amnesia, new learning is usually unimpaired. Confabulation may be
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Etiology
Secondary Gain
Recovery
Response to
sodium Amyul
Persona] versus
nonpcrsonal
memory loss
New Learning
Confabulation

KW.V

ciuuiaung urganic, Psychogenic and Feigned Amnesia

Organic Amnesia

Psychogenic Amnesia

Feigned Amnesia

Organic
Uncommon
Spotty

Emotional
Often
Full

Simulated
Always
Full

Worsening

Often improved

May or may not
improve

Both
Often impaired
In early stages

Personal
Unimpaired
Uncommon

Both
Unimpaired
Uncommon

present in early stages of organic amnesia, but is usually not present in either
psychogenic or feigned amnesia.
The most important aspects of the evaluation of the amnesic patient are
shown in Table I. Of these, neuropsychological testing is often the most useful, as it can document the presence of both kinds of amnesia anterograde and
retrograde, and maybe helpful in delecting the malingering patienL Furthermore, neuropsychological testing may help to document the presence of more
widespread intellectual deficits, since it is not uncommon for the demented
patient to present first with symptoms of amnesia.

ORGANIC HALLUCINOSIS
Hallucinations refer to the perception of a sensation in the absence of an external stimulus. Hallucinations may occur in any of the five senses: auditory,
visual, tactile, olfactory, or gustatory. Most commonly, hallucinations occur in
the presence of a functional psychiatric disorder such a schizophrenia or an affective disorder, They may also occur in the presence of a global organic brain
syndrome such as delirium (see below) or dementia. Occasionally, hallucinations occur in the absence of a functional or another organic disorder, in which
case the diagnosis of organic hallucinosis is made (Table VII.)

Any kind of hallucination may be the result of organic hallucinosis, but
auditory hallucinations are more likely to be functional than organic, and
visual, gustatory, olfactory, and tactile hallucinations are more likely to be organic than functional. From a forensic perspective, the most important determination is whether the hallucinations are malingered. Some of the characteristics which distinguish true from malingered hallucinations are summarized in
Table VIII. Malingered hallucinations tend to be more detailed, bizarre, fantastic, and complex. Malingered hallucinations are more likely to be sudden in
onset; functional hallucinations tend to appear gradually, often at first in an indistinct form and only becoming more distinct after a period of time.
Malingered hallucinations tend to be continuous, that is, subjects will report
that the hallucinations do not get better under any circumstances. Functional
hallucinations often wax and wane throughout the day and patients often
report that they can do certain things either to cause the hallucinations to disappear or to make them less bothersome. Malingered hallucinations are often unaccompanied by the appropriate emotions such as fear or bewilderment, and
are often unaccompanied by associated delusions. Functional hallucinations
can be quite frightening to the patient and are often accompanied by delusions
such as ideas of persecution. A patient malingering hallucinations is usually
quite willing to discuss them and may even offer them for discussion spontaneously: "doc, did I tell you I was hearing voices?" Patients with functional
hallucinations usually do not mention them at all until they are asked specifically and even then may be reluctant to discuss them. The presence of an antisocial personality disorder, a previous history of malingering, and obvious
secondary gain should alert the examiner to the presence of malingered hallucinations. Furthermore, the absence of symptoms usually associated with a
chronic mental disorder should raise the examiner's index of suspicion that the
hallucinations are malingered. These symptoms include flat affect, thought disorder, difficulties concentrating, inertia, and poor interpersonal relations.
The most common cause of organic hallucinosis is substance abuse, parTABLE VIII

Complexity
TABLE VII Diagnostic Criteria for Organic Hallucinosis
Onset
A. Persistent orrecurrenthallucinations are the predominant clinical feature.
B. No clouding of consciousness as in delirium; no significant loss of intellectual
abilities as in dementia; no predominant disturbance of mood as in organic affective
syndrome; no predominant delusions as in organic delusional syndrome.
C. Evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory tests of a specific organic factor that is judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance.
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Stability

Accompanying Affect
Delusions
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Differentiating True from Malingered Hallucinations
True

Malingered

Voices conversing, simple
images
Gradual, evolving from
indistinct, vague to fully
fonned
Wax and wane; patient has
control over their
intrusiveness
Fear, anxiety, bewilderment
Common

Fantastic, bizarre, complex
involving multiple senses
Sudden onset of fully formed
hallucinations
Continuous, nothing makes
them better
Lack of appropriate affect
Less common

ticularly by hallucinogens such as LSD and phencyclidine. In alcohol hallucinosis, the hallucinations usually consists of voices or unformed sounds
such as buzzing or hissing. Their onset is within the first 48 hours after cessation of drinking, and are accompanied by other signs of alcohol withdrawal,
such as sweating, insomnia, tremulousness and increased pulse and blood pressure. They usually occur in an individual who has abused alcohol for many
years. Their duration is typically less than a week, but approximately 10% of
patients develop chronic hallucinosis. Other common causes of organic hallucinosis include temporal lobe epilepsy and sensory deprivation.
ORGANIC AFFECTIVE DISORDER
Case Three
A 60-year-old male attorney with no previous history of psychiatric disorder was referred by his employer to determine his fitness to return to
work. He had no history of criminal behavior and was performing adequately in his job until six days prior to the evaluation. At that time, a
complaint was filed against him for making sexual comments about a
female co-worker. Over several days, he became irritable, shouted angrily
at his clients, and appeared to have difficulty concentrating on his work.
His thinking was described as disorganized. On the day of die evaluation
he had gotten into an altercation with co-workers and was brought to the
emergency room for evaluation.
On arrival he was unshaven and disheveled, despite wearing an expensive
suit. He protested furiously at being evaluated. His speech was rapid, difficult to interrupt, and changed quickly from one topic to another. He
paced throughout the interview. He denied hallucinations but admitted to
ideas of reference and persecution, saying his employer was jealous of his
knowledge and experience and wanted to discredit him. A call to his family physician revealed that he had begun taking the steroid medication
Prednisone two weeks prior, to treat an exacerbation of an intestinal disorder. The physician was concerned that the patient might be taking it excessively; the patient had told him that he had "never felt better" shortly
after starting the Prednisone.
The family physician convinced the patient to enter the hospital where,
after tapering the Prednisone and initiating low dose antipsychotic treatment, the patient returned to his baseline state: genial, considerate, and
without any sign of mania or* depression.
This is an example of an organic affective syndrome, caused by a prescription medication Prednisone. The diagnostic criteria for this syndrome are
shown in Table IX.
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TABLE IX Diagnostic Criteria for Organic Affective Syndrome
A. 'Ihe predominant disturbance is a disturbance in mood, with at least two of the associated symptoms listed in criterion B for manic or major depressive episode.
B. No clouding of consciousness as in delirium; no significant loss of intellectual
abilities as in dementia; no predominant delusions or hallucinations, as in organic
delusional syndrome or organic hallucinosis.
C. Evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory tests of a specific organic factor that is judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance.

The primary disturbance in an organic affective disorder is a change in
mood. In the manic form, the mood becomes euphoric, expansive, or irritable.
Associated symptoms may include an increase in activity or restlessness, increased talkativeness, flight of ideas, generosity, a decreased need for sleep,
distractibility, and involvement in potentially harmful activities such as sexual
indiscretion, buying sprees, and reckless driving. In the depressed form of the
organic affective syndrome, there is either a depressed mood or a pervasive
loss of pleasure in almost all aspects of living. Associated symptoms may include a change in appetite or sleep patterns, an increase or decrease in physical activity, a loss of interest in activities or sexual drive, fatigue, feelings of
worthlessness or guilt, an inability to concentrate, and suicidal thoughts. In
both the manic and depressed forms, psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations or delusions may be present
Organic affective syndrome is most commonly due to a side effect of a
medication, such as steroids (Prednisone), antihypertensives (propranolol,
methyldopa, reserpine), disulfiram (Antabuse), levo-dopa, cimetidine
(Tagamet), and tricyclic antidepressants (Medical Letter, 1986). Endocrine disorders, especially disorders of the thyroid, parathyroid, and adrenal glands are
commonly associated with changes in mood. Strokes to the left frontal lobe of
the brain, pancreatic tumors, withdrawal from a stimulant such as amphetamine or cocaine, head trauma and infectious processes as tertiary
syphilis, influenza, and mononucleosis are other causes of organic affective
syndrome (Krauthammer & Klerman, 1978).
While anyone presenting with a mood disorder deserves a careful examination to rule out organic causes, an even higher index of suspicion is warranted
for the older patient who has no previous history of affective disorder. Parts of
the evaluation deserving particular attention are a careful review of all medications, including those purchased over-the-counter, a urine drug screen, and
tests of endocrine functioning including thyroid and adrenal function tests.

ORGANIC DELUSIONAL SYNDROME
Delusions are fixed, false beliefs that are not part of one's culture. Examples
of delusions include ideas of reference and persecution (that one is the object
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„j uio rui, mat one is being poisoned by family members),
delusions of grandiosity (that one is especially gifted, talented, or possesses
special powers) and delusions of control (that one's thoughts, feelings, and actions are being controlled by others). They may be found in functional disorders such as schizophrenia and affective disorders, and in other organic disorders such as dementia or delirium. In some cases, delusions may be an isolated feature of an organic brain syndrome (Table X).
TABLE X Diagnoitic Criteria for Organic Delusional Syndrome
A. Delusions arc the predominant clinical feature.
B. There is no clouding of consciousness as in delirium; there is no significant loss of
intellectual abilities as in dementia; there are no prominent hallucinations as in organic hallucinosis.
C. There is evidence from the history, physical examination or laboratory tests of a
specific organic factor that ii judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance.

Case Four
In 1800, 43 years before McNaughton, James Hadfield fired a pistol at
King George III as the king entered his royal box at the theater. Hadfield
had been well until 1794 when he was wounded during the French
Revolutionary wars, receiving two sword blows to the head penetrating
the skull to the brain. On recovery, he developed the belief that he was
King George, and would stand staring into a mirror, looking for his
crown. Later he believed himself to be God or Christ, and thought that
only his martyrdom could save the world from disaster. Because suicide
was a sin, he conceived a plan where he would shoot at, but miss the
king, in the h(>pe that he would be executed.
During his trial, his attorney, Thomas Erskine, argued for the acceptance
of partial insanity, as manifested by Hadfield's delusions, as exculpatory.
After a dozen witnesses testified to Hadfield's unfortunate history, the
Chief Justice stopped the proceeding and the jury was advised to enter a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (Maeder, 1985).

The most common type of organic delusional syndrome is a paranoid state
marked by suspiciousness, tenseness, hypervigilance, pathological jealousy
and/or ideas of reference, and persecution. Substance use, particularly of amphetamines, cocaine, or hallucinogens is a common etiology and is often accompanied by an underlying personality disorder having paranoid traits.
Chronic alcoholism, Vitamin B12 deficiency, temporal lobe epilepsy, hyperparathyroidism and temporal lobe epilepsy have all been associated with organic delusional disorder.
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DELIRIUM
The final organic brain syndrome to be considered is delirium, a complication of many medical disorders, affecting 10%-40% of hospitalized patients.
Delirium is distinguished from the syndromes already discussed by the
presence of "clouding of consciousness," a term which signifies a state in
which one's appreciation of the environment is altered, and in which one's attention span is diminished. The altered awareness of the environment may be
manifested by drowsiness, by hyperalertness in which minor stimuli (such as
the sound of air coming through air ducts) are not screened out, or by misperceptions (hearing a door bang shut and believing it to be a gunshot). A
diminished attention span is manifested by an inability to maintain a string of
thoughts and an inability to sustain mental concentration, such as that required
to memorize and repeat a list of numbers. Associated symptoms include hallucinations, delusions, disorientation, altered sleep pattern, and incoherent
speech (Table XI for diagnostic criteria for delirium). The onset of delirium
may be abrupt, over several hours or several days, and its course tends to wax
and wane. Psychotic symptoms may be so vivid as to severely impair the
patient's judgment—delirious patients have been known to jump out of hospital windows, pull out catheters and intravenous lines, and become combative
towards staff and family.

TABLE XI. Diagnostic Criteria for Delirium
A. Clouding of consciousness (reduced clarity of awareness of the environment) with
reduced capacity to shift, focus, and sustain attention to environmental stimuli.
B. At least two of the following: (1) perceptual disturbance, misinterpretations, illusions, or hallucinations; (2) speech that is at times incoherent; 3) disturbance of
sleep—wakefulness cycle with insomnia or daytime drowsiness; 4) increased or
decreased psychomotor activity.
C. Disorientation and memory impairment (if testable).
D Clinical features that develop over a short period of time (usually hours to days) and
lend tofluctuateover the course of a day.
E. Evidence from history, physical examination or laboratory tests of a specific organic
factor that is judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance.

Delirious patients are not usually seen in the outpatient setting, because they
are usually so ill physically as to require hospitalization. The most common
reasons for forensic evaluations in these patients involve determination of competence to consent to or refuse treatment and competence to sign out of the
hospital against medical advice. However, even in these cases, forensic consultation is often not obtained, as either the patient's condition is so serious as
to require the medical staff to begin treatment immediately or because the
delirium goes unrecognized.
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Case Five
A 54-year-old man, hospitalized with a complaint of stomach pain became irritable with the nursing staff on the night following his admission.
He complained that medications weren't being delivered promptly and
that "since nothing is being done for me, I might as well as go home." He
demanded to leave the hospital and the medical resident on call was
notified. After examining him briefly, the medical resident allowed the
patient to sign out of the hospital against medical advice.
Within several hours, the hospital was notified that police had found the
patient lying at die bottom of a dry swimming pool located nearby. He
had apparendy fallen into the pool accidentally. He was returned to the
hospital where it was learned he had fractured a leg and an arm in the
fall. On examination by the psychiatric consultant, he was found to be
agitated, easily distractible, spoke in a rambling manner, and had hyperactive tendon reflexes elevated blood pressure and pulse, and was tremulous
and sweating. A telephone conversation with his wife revealed that he
had been a heavy drinker for many years, and had been "out of his mind"
several times previously when he had slopped drinking suddenly. A diagnosis of alcohol withdrawal delirium was made alter other causes of
delirium were ruled ouL

This case illustrates how easily delirium may be overlooked, especially in
the absence of prominent delusions or hallucinations. However, because
thought processes are so disorganized during delirium, patients may not be
able to exercise proper judgment wim respect to many areas of their life including medical treatment
In evaluating the delirious patient the emphasis is on a search for offending
substances, either prescribed medication, illicit drugs, or substances such as alcohol which are associated with delirium. The list of the medications reported
to cause delirium is very large; some of the more frequent ones include
steroids, analgesics (especially opiates), antiarrythmics (e.g., lidocaine),
cimetidine, levo-dopa, and antidepressants (Medical Letter, 1986). Many drugs
taken without adverse consequences by millions of people, may produce a
toxic delirious reaction in a patient predisposed by age or by previous injury
to the brain (as in chronic alcoholism). Similarly, a minor infection or metabolic derangement may produce delirium in a predisposed patient. Because die
presence of delirium often heralds a potentially serious medical illness or complication, every effort must be made to determine the etiology. In addition,
most cases of delirium can be quickly reversed once recognized. If there is a
question as to whether delirium exists, an electroencephalogram may be helpful; almost all delirium is associated with an abnormal EEG (Lipowski, 1980).
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Organic brain syndromes are important in forensic behavioral sciences for
several reasons. First, patients with organic brain syndromes often come to die
attention of the legal system. There may be questions about competence, such
as to make a will, to consent to or to refuse medical treatment, to manage
financial affairs, or to stand trial. There may be a question about criminal
responsibility; was a particular criminal behavior related to the presence of
delusions, hallucinations or mood changes, any of which may have had an organic etiology? Second, from a treatment perspective, an organic brain
syndrome signals the presence of an underlying physical illness. Often these
illnesses are highly treatable; in these cases the psychiatric prognosis is very
good, much better dian if the syndrome had been treated as a functional disorder. Finally, and especially important in the forensic setting, patients may
malinger mental illness, the most common example being malingered amnesia.
Familiarity with me clinical characteristics of the particular organic brain
syndrome makes it much more likely that the malingering will be detected.
When should a patient be evaluated for an organic brain syndrome? Although it is not practical to give all patients the most extensive organic evaluation, every patient should receive at least minimal screening: a medical history, physical examination, basic blood work, and, in die forensic setting, a
urine drug screen. The most complete organic evaluation should be reserved
for special cases. For example, a patient over 40 years of age who presents
with antisocial behavior of recent onset should be evaluated more thoroughly,
from an organic perspective, than a 22-year-old man with longstanding
psychopadiic traits. Odicr patients for whom there is an increased index of
suspicion for an organic brain syndrome include elderly patients, patients with
a long history of drug and/or alcohol abuse, and patients with a history of
trauma to the head.
Even in the absence of predisposing factors, tiierc are circumstances in
which a vigorous evaluation may be pursued in an attempt to uncover biological data. "Hard" data such as a CT scan or an electroencephalographic tracing,
which show "something wrong'* with the brain, may be more persuasive in a
courtroom than "soft" psychological explanations. Especially in high profile
cases where expense is relatively less important, organic data are vigorously
searched for, even in die absence of clinical findings which would suggest an
organic brain syndrome. Thus, a scan of the brain done on would-be presidential assassin John Hinckley, showing enlarged ventricles, may have helped to
persuade the jury diat he indeed did have "something wrong" with his brain.
They found him not guilty by reason of insanity.
Finally, organic brain syndromes are important in helping us to understand
the relationship between mind and brain. Studies which show an association
between specific lesions in the brain and corresponding defects in aspects of
mental functioning, e.g., speech or memory, are invaluable in furdiering our
knowledge in the neuroscienccs. Rather dian finding, as Eckstein (1970) said,
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tnat "no modern surgeon enters the skull to find mind/' perhaps it is more the
case that no modern psychiatrist enters the mind without finding brain.
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Menstruation and Crime: A Critical
Review of the Literature from the
Clinical Criminology Perspective
Bruce Harry, M.D
Charlotte M Balcer, M.D.

The authors review the literature on the relationship between menstruation and crime, focusing upon the methodological limitations of these
studies in the broader context of criminological and menstruation research.
Based on this review, they conclude: the present state of scientific
knowledge is such that it is unknown whether there is an association between any phases of the menstrual cycle and crime; there is no evidence
linking fluctuations in reproductive hormones to criminal behavior; and,
this lack of scientific knowledge is so glaring that evidence regarding
menstruation and crime should not be admissible in criminal trials.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between menstruation and crime has been a focus of
scholarly interest for at least a century In his review of women and crime, Pollak (1950) cited several late nineteenth and early twentieth century European
observations that reported an ostensibly positive association between ihc
menstrual flow and a variety of antisocial/cnrmnal behavior such as resistance
against public officials, shoplifting, thefts, arson, and homicide (Icard, 1890,
Aubry, 1891; Lombroso and Ferrero, 1894; Krafft-Ebing, 1902; Gross, 1905,
Gudden, 1907; Marx, 1908; Boas, 1909, von Hentig, 1930).
Among early English language writers, both Healy (1915) and Burt (1925)
thought menstruation amplified underlying emotional instabilities, with the
premenstrual phase perhaps being the time of greatest instability. However,
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APPENDIX "D"

1
2
3

coal mine and after —•
Q

So there was an injury while you were

employed at Peabody?

4

A

January the 16th, 1975.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

At 4:10 p.m.

7

Q

Okay.

8

sustain at that point?
THE COURT:

9
10

And what type of back injury did you

We needn't go through all of that.

That's already been litigated, counsel.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

MR. TREASE:

13
14
15

Q

Fracture of T-10, I was told.
Okay.

(By MR. TREASE)

Okay.

And did you receive

an impairment rating at that point?
A

I don't know.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. TREASE:

That's all in the file.
Okay.

18

Q

As far as that injury, you left their

19

employment.

20

Were you employed by another coal mining operation?

Who was it that you were next employed by?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Was that coal mining operation under the

23

name of Hiawatha?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Okay.

U.S. Fuel Company Hiawatha.
During what time period were you

1

Q

Okay.

And it shifted or it fell out?

2

A

Tipped over, due to air slack, you know.

3

That was about four foot thick, seven to eight feet

4

high and sixty feet long.
MR. BOORMAN:

5
6
7

Q

(By MR. TREASE)

THE COURT:

9

MR. BOORMAN:
date —

13

What, Mr. Boorman?
I was just wondering when the

when that injury was.
THE COURT:

11
12

Q

Was that the December injury?

(By MR. TREASE)

THE COURT:

15

THE WITNESS:

16

MR. DYER:

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Did that occur in December

of 1981?

14

17

What was the date of that

injury?

8

10

Can he date that injury?

It should have been '79.
No, it was

—

October 24th according to the

Findings of Fact of the prior litigation.
THE COURT:

The October '79 injury?

And then

there was a December '79 injury too.
MR. DYER:

Well, and an August '79 injury too.

There are three of them listed.
THE COURT:

Right.

Can't we just consult the

file on those, counsel?
MR. TREASE: Yes.
THE COURT:

Those were all previously
28

MR. BOORMAN:

Your Honor, if that doesn't show

up in the medical records, then he is not qualified to
answer it.
THE COURT:
MR. TREASE:
THE COURT:

Sustained.
Okay.
The records speak for themselves,

counsel.
MR. TREASE:
Q

Okay.

So do you believe now that you did actually

fall on the Northwest yard?
A

I don't know.

Q

You do not have a belief one way or the

other?
A

I have a mental picture in my mind that I

did, but I can't say, under oath, that I did fall in
the Northwest yard.
Q

Do you believe you fell?

A

It's very possible.

Q

Okay.

A

I have a mental picture in my mind.

Q

Following that fall or that flashback

scenario, you weighed the truck.

Is that correct?

A

Yes.

Q

And from that point, you left

A

I went over to the Roadrunner Truck Stop to

—

39

o

1

A

He suggested that I go on to Blythe and go

2

the hospital there, which was approximately twenty-six

3

miles away.

4

Q

Did you heed his advice and go to Blythe?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Did you seek medical attention at Blythe?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Do you recall who it was that attended you

9

at Blythe?

10
11

A
fellow.

The name I don't remember.

He was an intern or a student out of --

12

Q

Medically educated though?

13

A

Huh?

14

Q

Was he medically educated?

15

A

Yes.

16

He was a negro

He was the doctor in charge of

emergency room at the Blythe Hospital.

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

I was in the emergency room all day long.

19

Q

The records reflect that you, at that point,

20

The records reflect

underwent x-rays of some type.

—

Is that correct?

21

A

He took an x-ray of my back, yes.

22

Q

What did that x-ray portray?

23
24
25

MR. BOORMAN:

I think they'll speak for

themselves.
THE COURT:

That's true.

You needn't answer
46

The doctor told me that the blow to the back

A

1
2

of the head has caused a tremendous chemical imbalance

3

of the —

(By MR. TREASE)

Q

5

MR. BOORMAN:

6
7

Your Honor, I think

MR. BOORMAN:

4

—

Q

(By MR. TREASE)

10

A

And Dr. Kotrady

11

Q

Okay.

12

truck?

13

A

14

February —

15

1987.

18

whatever reports iwill speak

Dr. Bushnell •

THE WITNESS:

9

17

Which d octor is that?

for themselves.

8

16

—

Q

Okay.
Both.

When was the last time that you drove

February the 17th, —

No

Yeah, I think

Yeah, February the 17th , when I got home,

And why was it that you had not <iriven the

truck since that time?
A

I can't —

I can't saf:ely drive a vehicle

—

19

a truck down the road and maintain p roper lane control

20

and judgment and —

21
22

Q

Is that your personal opinion, or has

somebody else told you?

23

A

Highway patrolman.

24

Q

Okay.

25

Was there anybc>dy from the medical

profession that has told you not to drive truck?
66

